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Abstract 
 This study has two major purposes: (1) to explore the interaction of both Energy and Cli-
mate targets which European Union has posed to be achieved in view of 2014 and 2020 re-
spectively and (2) to investigate the effects of those policies especially the implications arose 
from the Climate Policies in the competitiveness of the Energy-intensive sector.  
 Using official data gathered by the European Union and the extensive literature regarding 
those aspects, the first part deals with the implementation of the Internal Energy Market and 
the Electricity target Model, as a mean towards integration. Then the thesis examines the 
decarbonization concept of the European Energy Policy, providing the relevant legislation 
and focusing on the harmonization between Member Sates.  
 Finally, since the thesis is additionally concerned on the effects caused by the Climate 
policies to the Energy Intensive Sector, the final part deals with those implications and aims 
to examine the extent to which the competitiveness of this sector is actually being influenced.  
 On the basis of the results to the research questions, it can be concluded primarily that 
both policies are complementary, but there are several malfunctions created dye to their in-
teraction. However, through the successful implementation of the IEM, the achievement of 
the climate targets would be accelerated. In addition, the thesis argues that a series of direct 
and indirect implications indeed exist and financially burden the EIIs which are claiming of 
delocalisation outside Europe. Yet, the data also reveal that the EIIs not only have suffered 
by the 20/20/20 targets, but also have gained a lot in monetary terms.  
 
Keywords: Internal Energy Market, Electricity Target Model, 20/20/20 targets, Harmoniza-
tion between Member States, Competition of Energy-Intensive Industries, Carbon Leakage 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
  
 The dissertation deals with two milestones of the European energy and environ-
mental policy, which are characterized by the terms defragmentation and decarboni-
zation. Firstly, the defragmentation of electricity market, which is about to be com-
pleted by 2014, describes sufficiently the idea behind the European's venture of the 
establishment of a single integrated energy market. From the 1990s, when a pro-
posal of a single energy market was initially held until 2009, a series of legislative 
amendments has followed, reaching today when Europe “makes her last move” 
through the Electricity Target Model, as an ultimate means to achieve this goal by 
2014. The tasks of an EU-wide Target model were designed to achieve the harmoni-
zation of co-ordinated EU-wide transmission capacity allocation, to manage conges-
tions and to propose a road-map with sound measures for the integration of forward, 
day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. Subsequently, Europe has set a second 
priority, decarbonization, as part of the fight against climate change, by adopting its 
Energy and climate package in 2008 for a 20% increase in energy efficiency; a 20% 
reduction in GHG emissions and a 20% share of renewable energy sources in final 
energy consumption. 
1.2 Statement of the problem  
 
 Globally, the European Union remains the only major region that has seriously 
tried to integrate its energy and climate policies. The energy part was the Third 
Package of 2009, while the climate part comprised the ETS mechanism, mandatory 
national targets for renewable energy and a softer target for energy efficiency.  
 -10- 
 In the progress of their implementation, the Commission's energy directorate has 
become significantly worried that climate-related policies are throwing up structural 
obstacles in the pathway to a pan-European market. Despite the integration chal-
lenge posed by renewables, the cornerstone of EU, the ETS seems to address a 
plethora of problems to the European energy-intensive industries, threatening their 
international exposure.  
1.3 Dissertation Objectives 
 to explore the functionality of the IEM under the scope of the EU policies 
for the 20/20/20 target 
 to identify the implications from the energy and climate policies (especially 
from the ETS) in the competitiveness of the energy-intensive industry 
 
1.4 The scope and organization of the study  
 
 The dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of the numerous EU policies 
regarding the proposed targets towards the completion of a single integrated energy 
market across EU. The prime considerations and the key parameters of the problem 
clarification are the harmonization between the Member States and the competitive-
ness of the EU -wide energy intensive industry.  
 Chapter 2 and 3 deal with the defragmentation of the electricity markets in view of 
2014. Initially, chapter 2 approaches the concept of the Internal Energy market of the 
third energy package (2009/72/EC), the amendments done as regards to the previ-
ous two packages and the equally important benefits gained from this unification of 
the energy market. Henceforth, chapter 3 analyzes the Electricity Target model, as a 
last resort of the implementation of a single energy market, by examining in depth the 
main areas of work.  
 As far as the decarbonisation EU policy is concerned, chapter 4,5 and 6    provide 
an extensive description of the EU policies and their provisions, regarding to the ma-
  -11- 
jor goals of the 20/20/20 targets from the perspective of the key parameters which 
were above mentioned. Notwithstanding, chapter 6 introduces the challenge of car-
bon leakage that energy-intensive industries face due to the EU climate policy and 
mainly due to ETS which remains EU's prime consideration. With this in mind, chap-
ter 7 is devoted completely to the energy -intensive sector, in an attempt to clarify 
whether is suffering from the EU climate-related policies or is receiving special treat-
ment, making the industrial competitiveness to override the low-carbon strategy of 
Europe. 
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2 The Internal Energy Market 
Framework  
  
 This chapter addresses the concept of the internal energy market of the latest 
Third energy package(Directive 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC) and the differences in 
the regulatory framework with the previous legislative packages. In addition, the 
chapter focuses the areas amended, in an effort to understand what has to be done 
towards the market integration. Finally, the chapter concludes with the overall bene-
fits of the implementation of this European vision can accomplish: the empower of 
consumers; more competitive pricing; liquidity in EU wholesale markets and security 
of supply.  
 
2.1 The main issue 
 
 The European Union aims to an internal energy market which promotes competi-
tion, is completely integrated and provides a sound foundation for the electricity and 
gas flow across all Europe. The driver for an internal energy market was the afforda-
ble access to energy and with intention to this, a wide-European market ruled by ef-
fective competition between various suppliers could result in keeping prices under 
pressure and a guaranteed for consumer's choice. The ideal term to characterize this 
venture is the term liberalization.(European Union,2003) 
 Despite the fact, that legislation providing for liberalization of gas and electricity 
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markets was initiated in 1990s, the main legislative package was established with the 
Second Electricity and Gas Directive in 2003. In the light of this Directive, the liberali-
zation focused on market opening and network regulation. However, competition was 
inadequate to play its welfare-creating role, since the so far market structure was 
characterized by state intervention and the mono-oligopolistic presence of incumbent 
firms. The picture of the electricity industry had indicated the existence of vertically 
integrated monopolies which were sometimes state owned. That involved, an effort to 
overcome barriers to energy in both generation and retailing and to an expansion of 
the effectiveness size of energy market from the national level to the whole of the EU 
through the creation of regional markets made up of more than one country 
(Pollitt,2009) 
 While this is true, the main obstacle for an integrated European energy market is 
the fractured nature of the European's Union electricity market which created a lot of 
discrepancies in the evolution of the energy industry, tackling the future competitive-
ness of the EU as a whole. As a consequence, the transition to a low-carbon econo-
my and in a general system seems impossible to be achieved.1 
 Across Europe, the existing system lacks of competition and this remains the “ug-
ly truth” for many Member States. This European energy challenge, combined with 
the overall climate challenges must be tackled in order to ensure a secure and af-
fordable supply in monetary terms to households and businesses. Unfortunately 
however, the insufficient network interconnections and the poor investments in the 
power networks prevented the efficient establishment of a single integrated energy 
                                                 
1
 The details for the implementation of the Internal energy market have been taken from the Communication 
on a 'Better governance for the single market', COM (2012) 259 final. According to this Communication, the 
European Commission has called the Member States for taking directly urgent measures towards this imple-
mentation.  
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market. The EU must make important changes to the way this market is operating 
towards a more reliable energy system by investing in generation, transportation and 
storage.  
 Seeking of putting in place the regulatory framework needed for the implementa-
tion of this market opening, the European Parliament and the Council agreed on the 
adoption of a Third Energy Internal Market Package. This new legislation consists of 
two Directives: the Directive 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC and three Regulations 
714/2009, 715/2009 and 713/2009 establishing the “Agency for the cooperation of 
Energy Regulators” (ACER). Henceforth, the creation of an integrated internal market 
for gas and electricity is addressed through the 3rd Energy Package with a view to be 
implemented by 2014. (Andoura, Hanser and Van de Woude, 2009) The following 
table 1 summarizes the three energy packages and some intermediate Decisions in 
order to have a clear view of what has been done.  
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Table 1 : EU Directives in electricity 
 
Source: European Commission  
 
2.2 Time for change 
 
 The third energy package, which came into force in March 2011,establishes the  
rules for a truly competitive European Energy market. Electricity and gas are the cor-
nerstones of everyday life and imperative for the economic activity globally. This new 
amended law was applied as the previously energy situation in Europe reflected the 
Package Date Name
First 19 Dec 1996
Second 26 Jun 2003
13 Nov 2003
9 Nov 2006
13 Jul 2009
Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity 
Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
Electricity
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity 
Commission Decision 2003/796/EC on establishing the
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas
Commission Decision 2006/770/EC amending the annex (“Congestion 
Management Guidelines”) of Regulation 1228/2003 
Third
Directive 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in Electricity
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (“ACER”) 
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need for improvements in five main areas. Initially was the unbundling, the regulatory 
oversight and the network cooperation, the transparency and the access to storage 
and LNG facilities.  
 The idea behind the unbundling laid out in the fact that the distribution and the 
production of electricity and gas should be separated – unbundled- in a way that 
network operators would no longer control or be affiliated on an active part of supply, 
generation and production. So far, the competition was being attacked by electricity 
companies which used to be vertically integrated and had increased their profitability 
through combined ownership of generation and transmission/distribution networks 
(Kotten and Ortmann,2008). In other words, the new legislation puts a stop to those 
companies who generate and supply electricity from using their dominant position to 
block competitors who try to enter the market and have access to the grid.  
 The 3rd energy package included the option of “ownership unbundling” in which, 
vertically integrated companies have to sell off their gas and electricity grids, and no 
supply and production company is permitted to hold a majority share in an energy 
transmission operator, nor would they be permitted to exercise voting rights or ap-
point board members in that operator. The Commission concludes that is “necessary 
to decisively reinforce the current inadequate level of unbundling” of the energy net-
works (European Commission, 2007). The initiative of ownership unbundling of the 
network operation from the vertically integrated undertakings is the most effective 
means to ensure choice for energy users and to encourage investments (Energy 
Sector Inquiry, European Union, 2007). Some MS such as France and Germany de-
clined the mandatory impose of ownership unbundling and therefore, within the 
framework of the third energy package only legal management and accounting un-
bundling were posed (Hautecloque and Rious, 2009). Under those circumstances, a 
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voluntarily nature enforces this structure of unbundling, despite the fact that unbun-
dling's benefits are focused on the promotion of fair competition and to ensure the 
well-functioning of the energy market.   
 The current energy rules reinforce the role of the Member States' national energy 
regulator. All regulators must be independent and having no conflicts or interests not 
only generating from the industry but also from the government. In the light of trans-
parency, the regulatory authority is responsible for monitoring the daily operations 
and to issue decisions of highly importance and impose sanctions where it is needed 
in order to restore the functioning of the market.  
 Furthermore, the record keeping obligation was introduced by the legislation in an 
effort of preventing any price abuse from the market participants. This can be 
achieved through the study of the past behaviour of the market participants by the 
regulators in order to define the nature of their operational and pricing decisions. The 
cooperation of the regulatory authorities among Member states is of paramount im-
portance for the security of the EU objectives, as only through this collaboration the 
effective market opening can be guaranteed. These requirements can help resolve 
partly the European failing of the implementation of the electricity and gas market. An 
efficient internal market for electricity and gas cannot exist without independent regu-
lators which can cooperate Europe-wide each other.  
 The current legislation encourages the cooperation between transmission network 
operators to enhance the access of competition through the transmission grids. It is 
highly important to strengthen the equality of all market players in order to guarantee 
an orderly management of the European transmission network. Towards this effort, 
the unbundling obligation plays a crucial part, since new entrants can compete fairly 
in the market. Moreover, the obliged establishment of a European Network for trans-
18 
mission System Operators2  is responsible for making the existing infrastructure to be 
used more efficiently. Under this institution a free flow of electricity will be enabled 
supporting the on-going market integration.  
 Subsequently, the network of operators is the incumbent party for monitoring, co-
ordinating the planned investments for new infrastructure using the best available 
technologies with respect to cross – border capacity. However, the best way in which 
this energy package will lead EU even closer to the implementation of the internal 
energy market is by achieving an effective and adequately   regulated competition. 
Only this way, competitive energy prices will be reached, sufficient security of supply 
and successful fulfilment of the climate and environmental objectives.  
2.3 The benefits of an integrated market 
 The Internal Energy Market was designed to contribute to the de-carbonization 
and to energy security and has been issued through a list of legislative packages the 
first in 1996/98, the second in 2003 and the third in 2009. The latter legislation was 
agreed that the internal energy market has to be completed by 2014, a deadline 
which at the moment seems infeasible. A lot of things have already been achieved 
but there is a possibility under which EU and the Member States will not meet this 
deadline and delay the truly benefits of this strategy. However,  if the European Un-
ion wants to achieve the decarbonisation in a cost – effective way then the internal 
energy market will be the key.  
 First of all, consumers had to buy energy for their residential needs by supplying 
energy from monopolistic entities before the market opening. (Andoura, Hanser and 
                                                 
2
  ENTSO- E for electricity and ENTSO – G for gas 
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Van de Woude,2009). In the event of energy market liberalization, consumers should 
feel represented, since in the so far traditional purchasing patterns, not only there 
were huge barriers for new entrants/alternative suppliers but in the case of their ex-
istence, out of fear of the unknown consumers were unlikely to switch to new suppli-
ers.  The implementation of the third energy package will reinforce the consumer pro-
tection by giving them help to compare the various suppliers from an open market, 
allow them to make the best deal according to their needs (European Union, 2007). 
By choosing the best out of all the other options, Europe’s citizens can take ad-
vantages by switching supplies, reducing their bills, choosing electricity generated by 
renewable energy sources or even increasing the service quality. All these options 
illuminate the consumer’s satisfaction within a regulated framework provided by the 
integration of the market. (European Commission, 2012) 
 The privilege of a tailor made pricing scheme which was the spontaneous reac-
tion from the previous mentioned benefit of the consumers' decision power are enti-
tled of, is normally created by consuming energy during weak periods at lower prices 
and avoiding the peak periods, enhance ever more the sustainability of an open in-
ternal market and result an efficient energy use.   
 Furthermore, the Internal Energy market will empower the consumers, through 
the ensuring of the transparency in the practices of the energy suppliers in an effort 
to make consumers become more active in the process of the whole energy market. 
In the case of a high level of transparency achieved in prices, the burdening of seri-
ous complementary costs to the energy price as well as taxes will be prevented, 
without letting the households consumers bear of those. In particular, the European 
Commission will support the further continuation of the promotion of a market- based 
price formation in retail markets (European Commission, 2010). On the contrary, if 
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this was not the case, state interference can seriously affect the borne of necessary 
investments in infrastructure.  
 To ensure adequate consumers protection, there is a need for targeted assis-
tance to the vulnerable part3, focusing on people with disabilities and severe financial 
issues. While this includes financial support to this category of consumers, subsidiz-
ing financially the final consumers, there will be created a need of non- financial sup-
port, especially for the people who are not in the position to take this kind of deci-
sions. This assistance will promote the exact objective of the self – decision proce-
dure of choosing the energy provider for each household and remaining the most 
cost-effective form of assistance.  
  The on-going competition will contribute to a more competitive pricing, as the 
open market will increase the cross – border trading and the gradual implementation 
of the integration. The ever more trading between the energy companies will un-
doubtedly lead in liquidity, which in this case consists the most important element 
which EU wants to achieve in the early phase of a major transition and for the proper 
functioning of a wholesale market (European Commission, 2012) 
 Towards the process of an integrated wholesale electricity market, market cou-
pling plays a significant role in the EU between the Member States. Market coupling 
gives the right to the parties interested to trade directly between markets by using the 
cross – border capacities. By achieving a better integration, a greater price conver-
gence will be enabled in the wholesale market (European Union,2011)4 
                                                 
3
 On June 2011, the Commission proposed a new Directive to step up Member States' efforts to use energy 
more efficiently at all stages of the energy chain – from the transportation of energy and it's distribution to it's 
final consumption. On 4 October 2012, the council endorsed the political agreement on the Energy efficiency 
Directive. The European Parliament had voted on such an agreement on 11 September 2012.   
4
 “Energy  Markets in the European Union in 2011” 
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 If the market becomes more functional, then it will reflect the economic value of 
power at each point of time. Generally, prices follow the basic economic principles 
measuring that they are low when the market is oversupplied and high when there is 
a shortage. The fluctuations of the price signals are likely to continue in the future, 
but are essential for better controlling of the consumption during peak demand. Fur-
ther technological advancements will support this trend. Smart metering systems5 
can contribute to the reduction of the household energy consumption. This trend, 
combined with the EU Trading System 6 will attract serious investments towards the 
evolution of the electricity systems in the future.  The integration of the markets will 
came closer to the stage of the completion across Member States, as the fluctuation 
of the demand responsiveness and flexible generation will absorb the peaks.  
 The achieved aforementioned liquidity of the wholesale markets has increased 
the security of supply in the EU. However, in the long term, there has to be adequate 
investment to better ensure the security of supply. The factor which can easily de-
termine the generation of investments is the evolution of the carbon market. In the 
case that the current oversupply of the EU ETS allowances will be addressed suc-
cessfully will create more certainty to investors and avoid the national mechanisms 
such as the capacity mechanisms to ruin the EU – wide price signal (European Un-
ion,2010). 
 Ensuring the equality of the companies in the market, a certain lever of playing 
field will be maintained through this the external energy relations can be supported 
and administrated. In the light of an open EU market a further expansion to operators 
from third countries is desired. As a result, an ever growing market will be estab-
                                                 
5
 BEUC, 'Empowering Consumers through Smart Meters', pp23 - 26 
6
 Directive 2003/87/EC as amended by Directives 2008/101/EC and 2009/29/EC 
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lished, going beyond the borders of the EU. An internal energy market with 500 mil-
lion consumers gives the EU and its companies weight in international trade.  
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3 EU’s weapon, the Electricity 
Target Model  
 This chapter aims to analyse the Electricity target model as a last resort towards 
the implementation of the Internal Energy market. A brief historical background of the 
target model as well as of its predecessor is followed, in order to understand the fun-
damental foundation of regional markets. To continue with, the principles of the target 
model are analysed the capacity calculation; the Day-ahead, the forward, the intra-
day and the balancing market.  
3.1  The forefather of Electricity target model 
 In spring 2006, a more enhanced effort towards the completion of the internal en-
ergy market was made with the launch by the then European Regulators for Electrici-
ty and Gas (ERGEG)7 of the Regional Initiatives (RI) with the sound support of the 
European Commission. This process included the establishment of seven electricity 
regions for the Electricity Regional Initiative (ERI) and three gas regions for the Gas 
Regional Initiative (GRI) as a means towards achieving regional market integration 
(ACER, 2013).  
                                                 
7
 ERGEG is now replaced by ACER  
24 
 Overall, this solution strategy was followed by a remarkable success, fostering the 
integration of the IEM and achieving a visible and improved market functioning. The 
Regional Initiatives, as created in 2006 are a result of a ten year process initiated 
with the first energy package (Directive 96/92/EC), which put in place for the first 
time,  common rules to be applied by the Member States towards the IEM. The Eu-
ropean Electricity Regulatory Forum, the so-called Florence Forum was established 
in 1998, having as a binding obligation to monitor the market integration process.  
 Following the adoption of the electricity part of the second Directive (2003/54/EC), 
and the complementary Regulation (1228/2003)8, the 11th Florence Forum has initi-
ated the creation of seven “mini – fora”9 to enable a more bottom – up regional ap-
proach with respect to congestion management issues. Figure 1 depicts the for-
mation and the geographical coverage of the “mini – fora” (European Union, n.d.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross – border exchanges in electricity.  
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/florence/doc/mini_fora/ERGEG_overall_assessment.pdf  
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Figure 1: Geographical coverage of the mini- fora. 
Source: everis and Mercados EMI  
 
 This promising idea had advantages and disadvantages concerning the huge 
number of stakeholders involved. The main advantage was the possibility of address-
ing the complex issues related to the congestion management promoted by the Reg-
ulation 1228/2003. However, the main disadvantage was the delayed coordination 
between the different mini fora, since the solutions for each region adopted were not 
mutually consistent despite the fact that, some Member States participated in two or 
more several mini – fora, such as France and Germany – which were participated in 
four of them – finally did not conclude to an efficient and adequate level of coordina-
tion. For this reason, a direct improvement to this “regional” idea was imperative. 
Since the project of a unification process of Europe's energy interconnection has be-
gun, the idea of the RI was a direct aftermath. The geographical coverage and struc-
ture of the seven Regional Initiatives10 is illustrated in the following figure 2.  
                                                 
10
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/studies/doc/2010_gas_electricity_markets.pdf  
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Figure 2: Geographical Structure of ERI  
Source : ERGEG 
 
 It can be extracted from the figure the Baltic region consisted of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, the Central East region (CE) with Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia. The Central South region is represented by Greece and Italy, the Central West 
(CW) by Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands. Also, the Northern region (N) in-
cluded Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, followed by the South West (SW) 
having as members Portugal and Spain. Finally, the seventh region of France, UK 
and Ireland (FUI) completes the updated energy EU map (European Union,2010). 
 The main characteristic of the RIs laid out at the fact that they had a voluntary 
profile and therefore it was a difficult procedure to pursuit the concurrent and direct 
coordination of the Member States. In the progress of having a certain level of visible 
results, the commitment of the stakeholders to participate efficiently and follow the 
necessary steps was of paramount importance. Fortunately, the stakeholders 
seemed to be more than eager to contribute. The design of the RIs would have 
worked in order to identify and eliminate regulatory gaps and to give practical solu-
tions. However, the idea of the RIs was a bottom – up approach and despite the sig-
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nificant success of it, it quickly became clear that RIs would not lead to a single inte-
grated power market by itself. For this purpose, the Electricity Target model was de-
signed.  
 
3.2 The next step 
 
 In a letter of Commission President Barroso to the members of the European 
Council argued that: 
“The completion of a fully functioning, interconnected and integrated in-
ternal energy market (IEM), which is central to Europe's competitive-
ness must not be fragmented”11 
 To that effect, the third energy package on EU gas and electricity markets en-
compasses a harmonized framework within EU. The key role in the whole process is 
being played by the ENTSO – E/G and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER). Among the legislated tasks of the ENTSO – E/G is to issue net-
work codes, aligned with respective framework guidelines issues by ACER for the 
facilitation of this harmonization, in order to enable the free flow of electricity and gas 
across Europe. These codes cover the significant areas in question which are equally 
important towards the completion of the integration, such as capacity allocation and 
congestion management, the forward markets and the balancing of them. The net-
work codes establishes a common set of rules concerning capacity allocation and 
managing cross bidding zone congestion in Day-ahead and intra-day time frame 
                                                 
11
 Http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-416-en.htm 
 
28 
(ACER, 2012). The following figure (Figure 3) describes the whole process of estab-
lishing the final network codes with the collaboration of both ENTSO-E and ACER 
and depicts the a time frame procedure from the draft issuance of  framework guide-
lines by ACER until the adoption of the final network code by the European Commis-
sion. 
 
Figure 3: EU network code procedure  
 
Source: Platts, 2013
12
 
 
3.3 The chronicle of the target model 
 The Electricity Regulatory forum – introduced in the previous sub-section – had 
undertaken in 2007 a project concerning the preparation of a discussion paper in 
terms of the implementation of regional and interregional capacity allocation meth-
                                                 
12
 http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/InsightAnalysis/NewsFeature/2013/ElectricPower/EUPack
age/Images/networkkey.jpg 
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ods.  The outcome of this study was the invitation to the ERGEG for establishing a 
Project Coordination Group (PCG), having as duty the development of a practical 
and easily functional target model for the broader harmonization of the regions. 
Moreover a detailed time frame and a road map with concrete measures were nec-
essary for the successful outcome of the imminent venture (REKK, 2011) 
 Finally, in 2009, the PCG presented an EU – wide target model, and an applica-
ble road map for the integration of the electricity regional markets, satisfying the are-
as of forward, day – ahead, intra -  day and balancing markets, as well as the capaci-
ty calculation and governance issues. At the bottom line, ERGEG would have to con-
tinue working on the framework guidelines on capacity allocation and congestion 
management (CACM). The Ad hoc Advisory Group of stakeholders which was estab-
lished by ERGEG for the development of draft framework guidelines, ceased its ac-
tivities, as required by the 3rd energy package, and bequeathed all these tasks to the 
jurisdiction of ACER Electricity Stakeholder Advisory Group (AESAG).  
 The principles of the target model which were defined through the extensive study 
of AESAG are the following: 
 Capacity calculation  
 Day – ahead market 
 Forward market  
 Intra – day market 
 Balancing market  
 Governance  
   The first four elements are included in the framework guideline for the Capacity 
Allocation and Congestion Management network code, recently completed by EN-
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TSO-E and forwarded by ACER to the European Commission, while balancing will 
have its own framework guideline which is about to be evaluated in the first quarter of 
2014. As far as the governance issues are concerned, there are going to be read-
justed by a direct comitology procedure. According to the network codes procedure 
illustrated in Figure 3 (see section 3.2), the following timetable provides information 
regarding the date of comitology release, date at which the network code is convert-
ed into binding law.  
 
Figure 4: Dates of deliverable network codes  
 
 
Source: ENTSO-E, 201313 
 
 
                                                 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/codes/doc/20130703_3years_electricity_june.pdf 
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Deliverable
ACER FG draft ENTSO-E code drafting Comitology 
Start End Start End Start End Start 
FG on capacity allocation and congestion management Q1/11 Q2/11
NC on capacity allocation and congestion management Q3/11 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q4/13
NC on forward markets Q4/12 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14
EC comitology guideline on governance Q3/13
FG on balancing Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q3/12
NC on balancing Q1/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14
FG: Framework Guideline
NC: Network Code
Scoping Phase
ACER 
evaluation 
Product/legislation relevant for effective implementation of the  IEM
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3.4 Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management mecha-
nisms 
  
 The Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) code aims to cre-
ate a single European electricity market by removing barriers for cross-border trade 
(ENTSO-E, 2012). Nevertheless, the CACM code includes only the Day-ahead and 
Intra-day market, since balancing and forward markets are to be covered by other 
codes. The following figure (Figure 4) contributes in comprehending the structure of 
the EU target model and its principles for the market integration. 
 
Figure 5: The EU Target Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ENTSO-E 
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 According to the Forward Capacity Allocation Supporting Document of ENTSO-E 
(n.d), the Target Model prescribes for the Forward market explicit auctions for the 
transmission capacity allocation either through Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) 
using the principle of UIOSI (use-it or sell-it) or through Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTRs). For the Day-ahead allocation, the Target model provides for implicit 
auctions through Market Coupling, in a way that cross-border capacity is allocated 
implicitly by matching the most competitive energy bids and offers. To continue with, 
intra-day allocation is prescribed to be implicit based on continuous trading rather 
than auctions. As for the Balancing market, although he evaluation of the draft net-
work code by ACER has not completed yet and is planned to be during the 1st quar-
ter of 2014, the target model foresees a TSO-TSO model with a common merit order.  
 
3.4.1 Capacity Calculation 
 
 According to the Framework Guideline CACM, the development of a common grid 
model is a prerequisite to meet the 2014 objective for the Internal energy market. 
This means, that individual grid models prepared by each System Operator will be 
merged into a single European grid model with intention to calculate cross zonal ca-
pacity in a coordinated. As stated in the Network Code on Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management of ENTSO-E (2013) submitted to ACER for evaluation, the 
Guidelines on the Management and Allocation of Available Transfer Capacity of In-
ter-connectors between National Systems annexed to Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 
require coordinated capacity calculation methodologies to cover the day-ahead and 
intra-day time-frames. For the further coordinated and optimal use of transmission 
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network capacity, there are two approaches a Flow – based (FB) method or a Coor-
dinated Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) method. Each of these two options requires ac-
cess to locational information in terms of relevant generation and consumption units 
(REKK, 2011) 
 The Net Transfer Capacity 14(NTC) is a measure to calculate the bilateral energy 
exchange capacities towards each of two adjacent countries, in both directions and is 
a well-known method, applied since the early days of the market liberalization. This 
method is based on the principle of evaluating and predefining a certain level of max-
imum commercial exchange capabilities for each border between bidding zones. As 
a result, there are some constraints in the operation of the NTC method. If an in-
crease on energy export volume occurs for example from Germany to France, this 
automatically reduces capacity available for exports from Germany to the Netherland 
(Neuhoff, Hobbs and Newbery, 2011). Thus, this power flow sets the maximum ca-
pacity on the interconnections between the bidding zones. In addition, as per its defi-
nition, for each inter-connector and commercial direction, two NTC values are calcu-
lated by the system operators. The lower of these values is accepted as the capacity 
available to the market. (REKK, 2011) 
 The available capacities, as calculated above, are traded in the market by various 
market participants through auctions which are held on a yearly, monthly and daily 
basis. In a NTC-based mechanism, an Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) is given to 
the market, and then the market participants send their bids for the desired part of 
this capacity to the allocation entity (ETSO, 2007). The highest bid price has the right 
                                                 
14
 “Net Transfer Capacity is the maximum exchange program (MW) between two areas compatible 
with security standards applicable in both areas and taking into account the technical uncertainties 
on future network conditions”. Source: ENTSO-E, Principles for determining the transfer capacities 
in the Nordic Power Markets, 2013 
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to receive the transmitted energy. The portion of the capacity sold forward (year-
ahead and monthly ahead) and also, the amount of energy reserved for the day-
ahead spot auctions consist a decisions framework for which the systems operators 
have the authority to work on.  
 On the other hand, the Flow – Based (FB) approach was developed through re-
cent evolutions in the field of the interconnected power systems. The FB method re-
sults in a physical margin on each critical grid element and an influencing factor in-
stead of one aggregated margin by NTC method. As a consequence, the FB method 
is much more efficient in dealing with highly meshed grids, and for short time frames 
is able to overcome more negative phenomena than the other solution, complying 
always with network security standards (ERRA, 2013). The use of Power Transfer 
Distribution Factors15 (PTDF) of the FB method is valuable since due to this tool, it 
can be easily estimated the influence of any zone-to-zone transaction on a particular 
grid element. However, there are some constraints regarding the transactions in the 
considered capacity calculation region, implying that the larger the considered region 
is, the better the FB method performs (REKK, 2011). 
 Yet, the key parameter for the successful operation of the FB capacity allocation 
is the correct definition of the bidding zones, in terms of shape and size. In the cur-
rent zonal markets, there is an absence of a market mechanism able to place a phys-
ical footprint of an internal transaction on physical cross-border flows. Hence, internal 
transactions within bidding areas do not need to be nominated as using cross-border 
capacities. Since, at the same time, they use cross-border lines, the problem of un-
planned transit flows is amplified. However, with a correct market design and well de-
                                                 
15
 “Power Transfer Distribution Factor represents the effect of a trade on all critical network elements” 
Source:Gyulay, Congestion Management in Hungary, 2013 
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fined bidding areas, most transit flows would be controlled by the market mechanism 
and be therefore considered as “market-based flows”. As a consequence, these 
would equally compete and have access to cross-border capacities and no transac-
tions would be privileged over others, enhancing the fair competition and eliminating 
discrimination. 
 A paradigm of highly meshed continental electricity grid is the one of the CEE 
(Central East Europe) region. From 2007, a dry-run implementation of a flow-based 
allocation was “under construction” (ETSO, 2007). However, according to REKK's 
report (2011), despite the development of a common grid model, the flow-based allo-
cation had not increased the available capacities for trading, which led to a delay on 
its application. As far as the Nordpool market is concerned, between Norway and 
Sweden and internally to Norway, maximum capacities are determined based on a 
flow-based day-ahead concept rather than a continental long-term NTC mechanism. 
The introduction of a flow-based mechanism for the CWE (Central West Europe) re-
gion was planned for this year (2013) 
 
3.4.2  The Day-ahead Market Coupling 
 
 Market Coupling is a method by which Day Ahead energy prices and volumes for 
each local market are calculated through the gathering of all Day Ahead bids and of-
fers in the different local markets, in order to match them at European level on a 
marginal pricing basis. The objective of the market coupling is to empower the com-
petition in the Day Ahead market by collecting the most competitive orders in Europe, 
subject to available interconnection capacities which are being implicitly allocated. As 
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a result, market coupling will function as a catalyst in the various energy pricing dif-
ferences occurred in the regional markets, as their interconnection capacities are in-
creased, developing a European-wide single price coupling by 2014 (ACER, n.d.). 
The market coupling requires arrangements between TSOs and Power Exchanges 
regarding each process stage, including pre-coupling aspects, the coupling solution 
and post-coupling aspects.  
 A recognized price coupling is necessary to achieve the European Target day-
ahead Model, according to the Florence Regulatory Forum (2009). In response, co-
operation between Nord Pool Spot, EPEX Spot and OMEL has been launched in 
2009 (European Energy Regulators-CEER, n.d.). This initiative by TSOs and Power 
Exchanges (PXs) in the NWE (North West Europe) region resulted in the Price Cou-
pling of Regions (PCR)16 which was designed to develop a single price coupling solu-
tion in order to calculate electricity prices across Europe and allocate capacities o n 
the day-ahead wholesale electricity markets in this region. In brief, NWE is part of a 
bigger goal, namely European Price Coupling which is the target model for the day-
ahead time frame, whereas NWE is a pilot target and is to be implemented by 2014. 
According to the latest report of Nord Pool Spot (30/09/2013), the NWE project co-
vers the markets of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Po-
land which is also coupled to Nordic via the SwePol Link and the target will be deliv-
ered on the 27th November 2013. The CSE region has been developed a high level 
plan in order to join the PCR project within 2014.  
                                                 
16
 Initially, the PCR was initiated by 17 partners both TSOs and Power Exchanges of the NWE region.From the 
side of TSOs are: 50hertz, Amprion, Creos, Elia, Energinet.dk, Fingrid, National Grid, RTE, Statnett, Svenka 
Krafnat, Tennet B.V. (Netherlands), Tennet Gmbh (Germany) and Transnet Bwand and from the Power Ex-
changes : APX, Belpex, EPEX Spot and Nord Pool Spot  
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 In the light of the Target model, the useful tool that is going to accelerate the mar-
ket coupling is the single price coupling algorithm, which is able to establish prices 
and volumes across all borders between market areas compatible with the capacity 
calculation (European Union, 2011).The functionality of this algorithm needs to be 
capable of meeting the requested objectives and the process starts with the gather-
ing of the bids and offers from the market participants within local markets, dealing 
with a series of constraints posed by the TSO's and finally ends up by merging bids 
and offers to deliver a series of outputs. Regarding to the PCR, the Euphemia17 algo-
rithm starting point will be the same for all borders (Nord Pool Spot, 2013). 
 
3.4.3 The Intra-day market approach 
 
 Generally, the intraday markets allow the market participants to balance their po-
sition and trade energy as close to real time as possible in order to minimize balanc-
ing options. Moreover, there is a possibility to predetermine their hedging solution 
and prevent negative consequences of possible imbalance exposures after the clo-
sure of the day ahead market. By developing a cross-border intraday markets and 
establishing a Pan-European solution based on a single platform will provide market 
parties with a wider range of options and allow a more efficient matching of deficits 
and surpluses across Europe. Today, the existing procedure, sets as follows, the clo-
sure of the day-ahead market occurs around noon before the delivery day, leaving a 
                                                 
17
 Euphemia is the name of the algorithm NWE will use and is a name of a Greek's woman which means “well-
regarded”. Also, the algorithm consists of the prefix -EU and the acronyms of PHEMIA (Pan-European Hy-
brid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm). It is hybrid because it supports any mix of ATC-based or 
Flow-based network models 
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time frame of 12 to 36 hours for conditions to change. The Target model aims to the 
implementation of continuous implicit trading of capacity products in order to simplify 
and allow the intraday trading across zonal borders.  
 The intraday approach of the Target /model provides for the implementation of 
continuous implicit trading of capacity products ACER,2011).Continuous trading in 
intraday energy markets consists the most successful solution in contrast to the auc-
tioning method, since unexpected changes can occur at any time and a direct reac-
tion seems imperative. The immediacy of the continuous trading enables the quick 
trading, which is an important advantage close to real time. Furthermore, continuous 
trading works only with a first-come-first served allocation method, a non-market-
based mechanism and therefore makes the continuous trading not much efficient.  
 On the contrary, there are three elements which bring the continuous trading 
“back in the game”. Firstly, there is a severe possibility that not too much valued 
transmission capacity would be available to be traded in the intraday market. This 
occurs, since the last signal of the value of the cross-border capacity is the price dif-
ference between zones in the day ahead market coupling. If the day ahead price is 
non-zero, then the entire capacity would be allocated through the market coupling, 
without enabling the trading in the intraday market. Secondly, the efficiency loss is 
limited in time, according to the time profile of continuous trading. Finally, intraday is 
likely to be rather limited in volume, which also prevents the efficiency losses created 
by this non-market capacity allocation procedure. 
 Again, a road-map for the introduction of cross-border intraday markets have 
been developed and is planned to be implemented by the fourth quarter of 2014. The 
North West Europe region (NWE) intraday project is seen as the European pilot pro-
ject of the CACM FG target Model. According to ACER (2011), “the intra-day cross-
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regional roapmap envisages a two-phase approach to implement an intraday trading 
solution, with an interim solution based on implicit continuous trading and an endur-
ing solution where this evolves to include intraday capacity recalculation, capacity 
pricing and the capability to trade sophisticated products”.  
 ENTSO-E and EuroPex proposed a Pan-European Flexible Intraday Cross-border 
Trading Scheme, comprising of a Shared Order Book (SOB)18 and a Capacity Man-
agement Module (CMM)19 continuously allocating the cross-border intraday capacity 
with the aim of having an interim solution by 2012 and an enduring solution by 2014. 
The following figure (Figure 5) shows the elements of the Intraday Target model.  
 
Figure 6: Elements of the Intraday Target Model 
 
                                                 
18
 Shared Order Book : gathers and centralizes information from the Power Exchnages 
19
 Capacity Management Module is a matrix illustrating the amount of transmission capacity available for each 
zone and this piece of information is provided by TSOs 
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Source: ENTSO-E 
 
 
3.5  The Forward capacity allocation 
 
 The major issue of price differences between the markets is becoming more 
complex, since the nature of these prices tends to be volatile, for example the price 
of transmitting from one zone to another is likely to be volatile. This volatility poses 
considerable risks in income for TSO's and risks concerning the transmission costs 
for the market participants.  
 Financially speaking, the Forward Capacity Allocation transfers the right to the 
Day Ahead price difference between two two zones from the TSOs to the market par-
ticipants who acquired the forward capacity. However, in electricity market the for-
ward trading is displayed on a continuous over-the-counter (OTC) basis, and for this 
reason, the Forward Capacity Allocation is not an option. The FG CACM though 
evaluates three alternatives as forward capacity approaches, the physical rights with 
UIOSI principle (use-it-or-sell-it), financial rights as options and financial rights as ob-
ligations (REKK,2011). 
 On the one hand, a physical capacity product gives the right to its holder to per-
form a cross-border energy exchange. Since, it is an option, not an obligation, when 
the time comes, it is not necessary to complete the transaction. If there is explicit 
day-ahead capacity after the decision time of whether a physical capacity right holder 
will use or not the option, is possible to resell a non-used right on a day-ahead basis 
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and forward the earnings from this sale to the former owner of the right by relying on 
the principle UIOSI.  
 On the other hand, a financial capacity product entitles its owner to receive a 
payment equal to the electricity price difference between two price zones. However, 
the operation of a Day Ahead market coupling mechanism is necessary in favor of 
the positive influence of the financial right of the holder in the effort to hedge the con-
gestion and transmission costs  
 There are two main differences between physical and financial capacity products. 
Firstly, the financial capacity products can be structured as options or as obligations, 
the physical capacity products though, only as options. Secondly, the latter can be 
issued by the TSOs, while the financial rights can be issued by anyone, mainly by 
financial institutions.  
 As far as the approach of Target Model and the allocation mechanism are con-
cerned, the FG CACM allows the TSOs to undertake the sale of the transmission 
rights on a single platform in a coordinated manner. The role of TSOs is essential in 
providing non-discriminatory access to infrastructures in all timeframes because are 
responsible for the auctions of transmission rights between all bidding zones (EFET, 
2010).  
 An important issue highly related to the forward capacity allocation is firmness. 
The Target Model requires full firmness of the forward capacity allocation, in a sense, 
that in any case of curtailment, TSOs should compensate the capacity right holders 
with an amount equal to the price difference between the price zones, instead of just 
repaying the initial (forward) price of the capacity. In case of reductions in the availa-
ble capacity TSOs shall be able to buy back capacity to ensure the security of the 
system (EFET, 2010). However, if a liquid transmission capacity rights secondary 
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market does not exist, then TSOs cannot take the role of “re-purchasers” (EFET, 
2007). Overall, the updated Forward Capacity allocation of the target model aims on 
long-term hedging solutions against congestion costs. (REKK, 2011) 
  
3.6  Balancing market  
 
 In short, balancing markets manage the procurement of primary, secondary and 
tertiary reserves and operate within control zones as a rule, although there are a few 
exceptions, considering the case of the Nordic market. In December 2013, the code 
is going to be submitted to ACER for evaluation, so that the Comitology procedure 
starts. The Electricity Target Model provides for the establishment of a multilateral 
TSO-TSO20 mechanism for sharing balancing energy. Each TSO will cooperate with 
at least one other TSO in two different Member States in the form of Coordinated 
Balancing Area.  Offers would be reserved and placed under a common merit order, 
since the transmission constraints have been taken into account.  
 The structure of the Network Code of Electricity Balancing consists of three ele-
ments: the procurement of Balancing Services in order to balance demand and sup-
ply, ensuring security and quality of supply as well; the reservation and use of Cross-
Zonal Capacity for Balancing; and the Imbalance settlement (ENTSO-E, 2013).  
 First of all, TSOs have the obligation to correct unexpected deviation between 
supply and demand in real-time by “setting-aside” a sufficient amount of energy to be 
                                                 
20
 “TSO-TSO Model means a model for the Exchange of Balancing Services with Transmission System Opera-
tors being the only entities involved in the Exchange of Balancing Services between areas. The TSO-TSO 
Model is the standard model for the Exchange of Balancing Services.” (ENTSO-E, 2013) 
43 
activated if necessary. This technical service is provided by Balancing Service Pro-
viders (BSPs) who secure energy in advance, as balancing reserves. Nevertheless, 
in the case that, TSOs will not have sufficient offers from the BSPs for balancing en-
ergy in real-time, then the hedging solution includes the reservation of a sufficient 
amount of energy capacity available in their Load-Frequency Control (LFC) Area.  
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4   Renewable electricity support 
policies in the European Union  
 
 This chapter attempts to cover the current legislative framework, regarding the 
policies towards the harmonization of support schemes for renewable energy 
sources in wide – EU. Additionally, an outline of the key features of the 20% increase 
target on renewable energy share of 2020 will be followed, in an attempt to identify 
and analyze the renewable support mechanisms, namely flexible mechanisms.  
  
4.1 Renewable Energy Policies 
 
  To begin with, on 23 April 2009 the Directive 2009/28/EC of the Council and 
the Parliament entered into force. With reference to this Directive, a common frame-
work was established for the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
(RES-E) in gross final consumption of energy and for the share of energy from RES-
E in transport.  
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  As a matter of fact, on January 2008 the Commission published the 2020 targets 
by the 2020 package21, known as EU Climate and Energy Package, which was tripar-
tite in structure. The package's commitment refers to a 20% greenhouse gas reduc-
tion target, a 20% renewable energy penetration target (including the 10% sub-target 
for transport) and a 20% increase in energy savings through energy efficiency 
measures (European Union,2008). 
  In theory, the imminent Directive of 2009 sets an overall target of 20% for the 
share of RES-E and 10% share of RES-E in transportation. Although, the sub-target 
of 10% equally applies to all MS, the main target of 20% varies from MS to MS, as it 
is translated to mandatory national targets, which each MS should have to meet. Ac-
cordingly, to a large extent the foster of non-fossil sources remains fragmented and 
left to the EU MS to deal with the further penetration of RES-E. In all respects, the 
feature of mandatory national targets for each MS has a significant novelty compared 
to the previous Directives22.  
 Equally important is the obligation of setting renewable energy action plans, 
unique for each MS. According to this, each MS shall adopt national action plans 
which depict the necessary steps, in order to comply the MS with their targets at na-
tional level. The purpose of these plans is firstly to give a certain degree of flexibility 
in the MS to decide for themselves how are going to handle this situation and subse-
quently to attract investors by creating security and contribute by defining clear goals, 
mobilizing private capital.  
                                                 
21
 COM (2008) 30 final  
 Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0030:FIN:en:PDF  
22
 Directive 2001/77/EC provided only indicative targets 
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4.2   The features of the Directive 2009/28/EC  
  
 In the final analysis, due to the absence of an agreement on a harmonized sup-
port scheme at first place, the targets of 2020 were going to be reached through sup-
port schemes based on economic models notably as flexible mechanisms and 
measures of cooperation between different and with third countries for achieving their 
national overall targets23(European Union,2009). 
4.2.1  Mandatory National Targets  
 
 As regards to the directive 2009/28/EC, Articles 3(1) and 3(2) refer to the manda-
tory measures that MS should follow, in order to reach the 2020 target for RES-E, 
under the title mandatory national targets. Specifically, MS are obliged to ensure that 
the share of RES-E of final energy consumption in 2020 is equal or exceeds their na-
tional target according to Part A of Annex 1 of Dir. 2009/28/EC. The renewable ener-
gy shares of final energy consumption in 2020, for instance are going to be calculat-
ed on the basis of 2005 share of each country plus both flat-rate increase of 5,5% per 
MS as well as a GDP-weighted additional increase. To demonstrate the range of the 
national targets in numerical terms the following table is considerable characteristic.  
                                                 
23
 Article 3(3) Directive 2009/28/EC  
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Table 2: National Targets  
Source:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2009:140:0016:0062:EN:PDF  
 
 
 Furthermore, in the process of guiding the chronicle of the implementation of the 
first 20% target for the RES-E, the Directive sets interim targets, in a way of monitor-
Belgium 2,2% 13%
Bulgaria 9,4% 16%
6,1% 13%
Denmark 17,0% 30%
Germany 5,8% 18%
Estonia 18,0% 25%
Ireland 3,1% 16%
Greece 6,9% 18%
Spain 8,7% 20%
France 10,3% 23%
Italy 5,2% 17%
Cyprus 2,9% 13%
Latvia 32,6% 40%
15,0% 23%
Luxembourg 0,9% 11%
Hungary 4,3% 13%
Malta 0,0% 10%
2,4% 14%
Austria 23,3% 34%
Poland 7,2% 15%
Portugal 20,5% 31%
Romania 17,8% 24%
Slovenia 16,0% 25%
Slovak Republic 6,7% 14%
Finland 28,5% 38%
Sweden 39,8% 49%
United Kingdom 13,0% 15%
Share of energy from renewable 
sources in gross final consumption 
of energy, 2005 S
2005
Target of energy from renewable 
sources in gross final consumption 
of energy, 2020 S
2020
Czech Republic
Lithuania
Netherlands
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ing the development of RES-E in MS. With reference to this, the proposed indicative 
trajectory24 consisted of the following shares of energy form RES-E: 
 S2005 + 0,20(S2020 – S2005), as an average of the two year period 2011 to 
2012; 
 S2005 + 0,30(S2020 – S2005), as an average of the two year period 2013 to 
2014; 
 S2005 + 0,45(S2020 – S2005), as an average of the two year period 2015 to 
2016; 
 S2005 + 0,65(S2020 – S2005), as an average of the two year period 2017 to 
2018; 
   Where  
   S2005  = the share for that Member Sate in 2005, as indicated in the table 1 
in part A 
   S2020 = the share for that Member Sate in 2020, as indicated in the table 1 
in part B 
 
 As it was already mentioned through the establishment of the Directive 
2001/77/EC a 12% overall target was implemented, as well as a relevant increase of 
21% target for the share of RES-E in the electricity sector25. However, the reported 
information has shown that the progress varies from MS to MS, mainly due to the dif-
ferent needs resulting from the different idiosyncratic features of each MS. In general, 
MS have different renewable energy potentials and operate different schemes of 
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 Annex I, part B, Directive 2009/28/EC 
25
 COM(2009), 192 final, p.3 
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support for energy from RES-E at national level. While some MS for instance Ger-
many, Spain, Denmark and Hungary have already reached or exceeded their nation-
al targets, some others are far behind, and this reason justifies the deviations in the 
percentages of the national targets, ranging from 10% for Malta to 49% for Sweden.   
 To emphasize a cost-effective allocation of national targets is essential seeking a 
fair sharing of financial burden, because this mechanism creates in place a gap be-
tween MS's national target and their potential for cost-effective generation of RES-E. 
For this purpose, these discrepancies can be corrected through the flexible mecha-
nisms, which can allow MS to count to RES-E generated in other MS and third coun-
tries contributing to their national targets. The Directive 2009/28/EC aims to facilitate 
a cross-border support of energy from RES-E without affecting national support 
schemes. In this event, a net financial flow can be generated from countries with high 
target and low potential to countries with low targets and high potentials. For the ulti-
mate target compliance, both national support schemes and cooperation mecha-
nisms are essential as long as the MS are able to determine the extent at which they 
will collaborate and rely on other MS for RES-E produces on them.  
  
4.2.2 Flexible mechanisms 
  
 In the attempt to create opportunities for reducing the cost of achieving the targets 
laid down in the Directive, flexibility measures are essential. These mechanisms will 
allow MS to achieve their national targets in cooperation with other MS. With refer-
ence to a study of the “Design options for cooperation mechanisms under the new 
European renewable energy directive”, there are several similarities with the flexible 
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mechanisms introduced in the Kyoto Protocol. EU members are entitled to implement 
joint projects between EU members (similar to joint implementation mechanism) and 
with third countries (similar to Clean Development Mechanism). This measure can 
lead not only to overall cost savings for reaching national RES targets, but also for 
the overall European target for 2020. The Flexible mechanisms under the light of 
RES Directive take the form of statistical transfers, joint projects between the MS or 
joint support schemes. (Klessman, Lamers, Ragwitz, & Resch, 2010)26 
 Statistical transfers27: MS have the possibility to make a statistical trans-
fer of a specified amount of energy generated from renewable sources 
from one MS to another. This amount will be deducted for target counting 
purposes on the side of the transferring MS and added on the side of the 
State accepting the transfer. Statistical transfer arrangements may have ef-
fect for one or more years and must be notified to the European Commis-
sion no later than three months after the end of each year in which they 
have effect.  
 Joint projects between MS or between MS and third countries: MS 
may cooperate with another one or more MS on all types of joint projects28 
regarding the production of electricity, heating or cooling from renewable 
energy sources. This mechanism concerns as well third countries for the 
position of the joint country as long as, the provisions of the Directive are 
not violated. In other words if a MS is participating in a joint project, then is 
                                                 
26
 Klessman,C.  Lamers,R. Ragwitz,M. and Resch,G., 2010. Design options for cooperation mechanisms under 
the new European renewable energy directive. ELSEVIER, [e-journal] 38(2010) 4679-4691. Available 
through: <www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol> [ Accessed on 9 September 2013].  
27
 Art 6, Directive 2009/28/EC 
28
 Art 7, Directive 2009/28/EC 
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entitled to add a specific percentage of RES-E produced by such a project 
towards their respective national renewable energy targets.  
 Joint Support Schemes: According to art. 17 of the Dir. 2009/28/EC, two 
or more MS can set up joint schemes and co-ordinate the national support 
schemes for the promotion of renewable energy on a voluntary basis. As 
regards to support schemes, the Directive defines “any instrument, scheme 
or mechanism that promotes the use of energy from RES-E by reducing 
the cost of that energy, increasing the price at which can be sold, or in-
creasing by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the vol-
ume of such energy purchased”.   
 
4.3 Cooperation or harmonization?  
 
 The EU has already set a sequence of objectives for RES-E, but it is largely left to 
the MS to choose the way they are going to accomplish the “sub-objectives” which 
will lead to the 20% target vision for RES. Consequently, an important conclusion can 
arises from the Directive, that the target will be achieved by a concept of a parallel 
national schemes and not though an EU – wide harmonized support scheme. Ac-
cording to the Directive, MS are allowed to exclude RES-E produced in another MS  
from access, and for this reason the FMs were established to enable the energy ex-
changes within EU.  
 It was clear, that the Commission has rejected the idea of an EU-wide harmoniza-
tion support scheme, due to the continuous opposition which the majority of the MS 
has shown. As a result, the political debate has switched from harmonization to co-
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operation and coordination of the energy affairs of the MS. The mandatory national 
targets, resulting in the national action plans, force the MS to act by creating an indi-
vidual strategy based on direct fixed-price or fixed-quantity mechanisms. On the 
whole, the MS's control over their individual support schemes was the case in the re-
jection of a harmonized scheme, because it satisfies the fact that MS, especially with 
low potentials “may not be willing to pay the bill if they do not profit from the local 
beneficial effects29”. But a key question which arises is if the new Directive and the 
amendments regarding the penetration of RES-E introduced FMs as a possible har-
monization instrument, which domestic support mechanisms lead the MS to deny a 
single support scheme? And in the case that there were a lot of arguments against 
harmonization, for what type of harmonization we are referring to? 
 The support schemes used by the MS were not based on a common EU instru-
ment, provided that each MS developed each own set of strategy to promote RES-E 
in its territory. All the support schemes in the EU were premised on economic mod-
els, targeting either in the price or in the quantity of the energy generated from re-
newable sources. Therefore, there are two main categories at which we can distin-
guish those mechanisms in the table below:  
 Fixed-price mechanisms: 
 Feed-in tariffs (FIT): Feed in tariffs is the most widely used mechanism 
throughout the EU. Generally, this tariff is the price paid for each kWh 
to the generators by suppliers in order to feed the grid-network with 
electricity from “green” energy sources. The difference between the tar-
iff paid to operators and the electricity they feed into the grid is paid by 
the consumers or taxpayers. 
                                                 
29
 COM(2005)627 final,p.12 
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 Feed-in premium (FIP): Feed-in premium, in essence functions similarly 
as the previous mentioned feed-in tariff, and since is the price paid to 
the operators for the electricity feed into the grid. Hence, the price is de-
termined well in advance. The element which differentiates it from the 
fixed feed-in tariffs is that the premium is the difference in price be-
tween a varying reference market price and a guaranteed minimum 
price.  
 Investment aid: This type of subsidizing concerns direct payments 
which are given to installations and are usually granted for the power 
generator's capacity, in an effort of promoting electricity from efficiently 
operated facilities and to encourage the costly transition to green tech-
nologies.  
 Tax benefits: There are certain tax incentives and benefits created spe-
cifically for the renewable energy sector. Usually, these benefits are re-
lated to the generation of electricity from renewable sources, and in 
overall, a tax benefit has the same function as the feed-in tariff mecha-
nism.  
 Fixed-quantity based mechanisms: 
 Tradable Green certificates (TGC): TGC's is an instrument which can 
contribute to the overall target of RE sources and simultaneously 
achieves a cost-efficient development of RES in a liberalized energy 
market. These green certificates validate the “green” origin of the elec-
tricity produced and fed into the grid. The certificates are supplied to the 
generators as follows, by providing to the producers of RE a certificate 
for each unit of RE sold to the grid and since those certificates are trad-
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able financial assets are being trade in a separate market rather than 
the physical energy market. The additional cost of producing RE is re-
flected by the sold certificates on the certificate market. Due to this, the 
received price for the RE producer will be the summation of the market 
price for the physical energy market and the market price for certifi-
cates. So far, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
UK have the most developed systems of TGC's in Europe.  
 Competitive bidding (tendering): Due to the complexity and the capital 
intensiveness of energy projects, project developers usually bid for con-
tracts or agreements such as the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
I order to reassure the future profitability. The developers/ owners re-
ceive an amount which is the difference in price between the agreed 
tariff through this type of contract and the wholesale price for energy 
produced from non-renewable sources.  
 All the above constitute a number of possible direct mechanisms which a MS de-
ployed in order to foster the promotion of RES, but these regulatory approaches re-
spond only to regional conditions. The common target setting will be achieved with 
the assistance of the FMs, but considering the different policy frameworks designed 
by each MS, then the status of the Commission's venture is defined as central co-
ordination. Hence, a “convergent” policy in European level is resulting from the 
Directive, of a one support instrument in all MS, which is going to be designed 
separately. The deviations in the relevance of the different degrees of harmonization 
result in implications at national level. Even if the support instrument in each MS is 
independent from each another, the framework of flexible mechanisms will align 
those differences by unifying all MS under a policy harmonization.  
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4.4 Towards harmonization in RES  
  
 The absence of a real harmonized policy is due to the numerous national conflicts 
of interest which Europe suffers from. From a technical perspective, the development 
of interconnections and their current harmonization under market coupling initiatives 
reflects a level of European integration, but still national policies provoke discrepan-
cies, mainly because the development of interconnections do not have necessarily a 
commercial basis.(Jansen et al. 2005) 
 The necessary movement EU should take is the balance between EU energy pol-
icies and coordination with national policies and regulations. In the light of a single 
energy market with harmonization “spirit” as core, the most influential role is being 
played by the MS’s political willingness to contribute effectively to the integration. 
 RES technologies are characterized by high investment costs and long payback 
periods. These idiosyncratic characteristics require a stable system in order to attract 
positive investment decisions. Indeed, even though energy policy for RES provides a 
small degree of harmonization, the non-harmonization has a significant effect on the 
development of RES technologies. However, there are a number of reasons which 
provoke impacts in favor of this matter, such as the on-going pressure of the comple-
tion of the internal energy market, the economic downturn and the EU’s Emission 
Trading Scheme carbon price.  
 Consequently, RES penetration needs to tackle certain economic, institutional, 
political and legislative nature barriers. During this transition period, national 
schemes should overcome those barriers which affect competition, because in the 
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case of achieved cross-border interconnections (besides the already established i.e. 
Nordpool), the volumes of RES will increase and as a consequence the competition 
in the power sector will increase as well. So, the divergent national policies among 
MS constitute a policy related to the forthcoming increase in volumes of RES-E in the 
EU.  
 The European Commission has elaborated the recent signal of the existing condi-
tions as outlined in January 2011 Communication that harmonization could be envis-
aged in the long-term. In the meanwhile, for the medium term, the direct fixed price 
mechanisms or quota-based systems such as feed-in tariffs and TGCs respectively 
will be necessary in financing convergence.  
 In a word, the RES Directive lays the ground for the RES policy framework until 
2020, however as it has been seen from the recent reports and assessments, this 
strategy will be continued beyond 2020, if it is going to achieve the already posed 
targets. So far, it appears that the tactic of cooperation and coordination between the 
MS has been proved beneficial and the overall frictions will be resulted from the RES 
markets if are not going to be amended. 
  However, the MS seem to ignore the flexible (cooperation) mechanisms pro-
posed by the EU's Energy Renewable directive, which as per their definition can lead 
to the integration of the system and as a result, can provide progress with the EU 
IEM. The only exception to this remains the joint renewable energy support scheme 
between Norway and Sweden (Wigand, 2013).  
 The proposed uniform RES certificate trading will not lead to RES policy harmoni-
zation, and for this reason, the on-going strategy consists of a complex interplay of 
coordination, cooperation and selective harmonization (referring to policy harmoniza-
tion of a one support instrument selected by each MS, supported by the different op-
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tions of FMs). The mixture of top-down and bottom-up processes will continue by fo-
cusing on the harmonization minimum criteria (top-down) defined by the Directive, 
and the intensified coordination between MSs (bottom-up). This option would foster 
policy convergence and market integration, while respecting the MS's different choic-
es, which should increase the political feasibility and public acceptance of such an 
approach.  
 In the final analysis, the provisions of the Directive are very pushful, commencing 
with the mandatory national targets which will force MS to act effectively. According 
to Michael Valdner30, up to now the history of the past has showed that the outcomes 
towards renewable energy targets were relying on national RES-industry develop-
ment and were beneficial as well. The MS's reluctance of setting aside these benefi-
cial effects played a crucial role in the prevention of a harmonized support scheme 
concept (Valdner, 2011). Nevertheless, the various policy reversals create a regula-
tory uncertainty which justifies the MS' preference of supporting national renewable 
strategies. However, it is important to realize that the economic downturn remains the 
most important determinant of the infrastructure investment needed to be done in or-
der to create the cross-border interconnections. Provided that the lack of liquidity   
leave no room for unsound measures at national level-since a harmonized context is 
undesirable-, it is possible though that MS ignore the fact that their “national solu-
tions” would be most expensive. 
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 Valdner, M. (2011). how is the lack of a harmonized support scheme in the Directive 2009/28/EC likely to 
affect achievements of the renewable energy targets?, Centre of Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and 
Policy Getaway, 14, 5, pp.7-11 
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5 Substantial steps for Energy Ef-
ficiency  
 This chapter addresses the legal framework of the energy efficiency measures in 
order to achieve the 20% increase in the energy savings.  
 Another major issue of this chapter will be the harmonization options and at which 
level can be achieved.  
 
5.1 Steps up to the present time 
 The on-going inability of EU MS to use energy efficient standards was extremely 
costly not only for the budget at national and European level, but also for the sustain-
able future of EU, which is completely linked to the energy independence, EU forces 
to achieve.  The first step and the most influential one, was the realizing of the EU 
saving potentials, accompanied of a support of a strengthened policy, EU saving po-
tentials could outreach 20% by 2020.  
 According to the “old” 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, all the steps for im-
provement had as core approach the energy consumption and a “paradigm shift” in 
the life styles of the societies which would have to be implemented. Even though, the 
existing technology would have posed a significant contribution towards this direc-
tion, the uptake of innovative technologies could encourage the Action Plan projec-
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tions. The policy framework and the measures were based on the Green Paper31 on 
Energy Efficiency in which all the necessary questions were responded and formed 
the ideal structure in order to improve the quality of the information regarding to the 
energy consumption and the best available technologies.  
 The plan outlines a list of cost-effective measures, focusing on the lowest life-
cycle cost method which was defined to be as the most easy-to-interpret measure of 
economic evaluation, and in addition all the primary actions needed to be implement-
ed straight forward, as well as the actions needed to be taken gradually in the time 
lag until 2020. The sectors in which the plan targeted were the residential and com-
mercial buildings, the transport and the manufacturing industry, categorizing the first 
two as the most important, partly due to their large share in energy consumption.  
 In summary, all the proposed measures32 of the 2006 Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan were summarized on the following table 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Green Parer on Energy Efficiency, “Doing more with less”, COM(2005) 265 final of 22.06.2005 
32
 These measures were summarized in the Annex of  the Communication from the Commission regarding the 
“Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential”, COM(2006) 545 final.  
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Table 3: Measures proposed on the 2006 Action Plan by Commission 
 
 
 Until the 4th of February 2011, the date at which the Commission launched the 
new updated Energy Efficiency Plan of 2011, substantial steps have been taken. 
Hence, up to this time, Commission's estimates found that EU could achieve only half 
of the 20% objective and for this reason; this new plan was needed to get back on 
track. According to the Commission's Communication for this 2011 plan, the existing 
and the new developed measures “will transform our daily life and have the potentials 
to generate financial savings of up €1000 per household every year; improve Eu-
rope's industrial competitiveness; create up to 2 million jobs; and reduce annual 
greenhouse gas emissions by 740 million tons”.  
 On 25 October 2012, the EU adopted the Directive 2012/27/EU regarding energy 
efficiency33 by amending appropriately previous Directives 2009/125/EC and 
2010/30/EU. The link between this Directive and the Energy Efficiency Plan of 2011 
                                                 
33
 Energy Efficiency as it is provided in the Directive 2012/27/EU means the ratio of output of performance, 
service goods or energy to input of energy.  
Measures
1
2 Improving energy transformation 
3 Establishing transport efficiency measures
4 Financing energy efficiency, economic incentives and energy pricing
5 Changing energy behavior
6 Launch of international partnerships
Dynamic energy performance requirements for products, buildings and 
services
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is that the first convert all the elements presented in the plan to binding measures for 
the MS. Consequently, the purpose of this Directive was the establishment a com-
mon framework of measures towards the promotion of energy efficiency improve-
ment34 within EU in order to realize the 20% increase in energy savings by 2020.  
 According to this Directive, each MS should set a national efficiency target to 
achieve within the time boundaries posed by the Commission, based on either prima-
ry35 of final36 energy consumption. Again, the same procedure implies for all MS, they 
should prepare a plan with their projections, and a list of measures according to their 
methodology, in order to be assessed by the Commission. Even though this directive 
sets minimum requirements for the MS, in a gesture of good faith Ms can set the limit 
higher and propose even more drastic and stringent solutions.  
   
5.1.1 Energy efficiency in the building sector 
 
 The higher concern deals with the energy saving potentials in buildings. For this 
domain, the plan provides measures regarding, renovation procedures in public and 
private buildings, and improvement in the energy performance of the buildings' com-
ponents and appliances used in them. As far as the public sector is concerned, the 
focus is directed to the refurbishment of public buildings and the encouragement of 
high performance in cities and communities. This sector is crucial for this ambitious 
                                                 
34
 Energy Efficiency Improvement means an increase in energy efficiency as a result of technological, behav-
ioural and economic changes  
35
 Primary energy consumption means gross inland consumption, excluding non-energy uses  
36
 Final energy consumption means all energy supplied to industry, transport, households, services and agricul-
ture. It excludes deliveries to the energy transformation sector and the energy industries.  
62 
endeavour towards the increase of energy efficiency, since public spending accounts 
for 17% of EU GDP37.  
 The Commission's work can be summarized up to four categories for the public 
sector. First of all, there is a necessity for reducing public authorities’ expenditures on 
energy bills and especially in this period of time at which Europe is struggling to 
overcome the effects of the on-going euro zone financial crisis. For this reason, the 
development of procurement criteria that take energy efficiency into account were 
built. More particularly, from 2019 onwards, the sector's new buildings will have to 
reach a zero-energy38 performance level.  
 Following, all the public bodies should take care to lead the public buildings up to 
high energy performance level and for this to be done as a start it would be neces-
sary to double the current renovation rate. These are binding measures which re-
quest 3% refurbishment of their buildings (by floor area) each year.  
 Furthermore, the Commission called for Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) to 
contribute in both private and public sector. For the successful outcome of this 
measure, the Commission attempted for the second time (the first in 1993) to legalize 
a useful tool such as the energy performance contracting, which will result to the ren-
ovation in public buildings and the upgrading the energy efficiency level of public 
buildings. In short, energy performance contracting is a performance-based pro-
curement method and financial mechanism for building renewal whereby utility bills 
savings that result from the installation of new building systems. In some MS this 
method has proved to be cost-effective, including Denmark, France and Germany, 
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 SEC(2011)277: Impact Assessment accompanying the 2011 Energy Efficiency Plan  
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 As S. Kilkis stated in “A new metric for Net-Zero Carbon Buildings”: “a  Zero energy building is a building 
which has a total annual sum of zero energy transfer across the building district boundary in a district ener-
gy system” .  
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yet in some others MS, the uncertainties of the legal framework caused a series of 
problems delayed or preventing their deployment.  
 Another important issue is that these energy efficient buildings solutions require 
the proper technically skilled and trained personnel for their implementation. In order 
to ensure a notably involvement and contribution of the relevant professionals, the 
Plan supports the Commission's need for specialized people who were trained or will 
be trained for these technologies and this is widely requested in the Commission's 
Flagship Initiative “ An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs”.  
  
5.1.2 Energy Efficiency for competitive Europe  
 
  The outcomes of the assessments have proved that in a percentage of 30% of E 
U’s primary consumption is consumed by the energy sector, for energy transfor-
mation into electricity and heat and also for their distribution. As a consequence, 
there is a necessity for new generation capacity and infrastructure and together with 
the existing capacity should meet the best available technology (BAT).  
  As far as the efficient generation of heat and electricity is concerned, an im-
portant task is the effective recovery of heat losses from electricity and industrial pro-
duction processes. The Commission proposes the greater use of high-efficiency 
combined heat and power (CHP)39 systems and that district heating systems are 
combined with electricity generation wherever is possible. In the process of improving 
the energy performance of CHP systems, the electricity produced from CHP should 
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 More details in the Directive 2004/8/EC on the promotion of Co-generation based on a useful heat demand in 
the internal energy market and amending Directive 92/42/EEC 
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have priority in the grid access. In addition, the grid regulators should take into ac-
count energy efficiency, including prioritizing energy efficiency in regulations, tariffs, 
networks and technical codes.  
 Moreover, MS have as a prerequisite to establish energy savings obligations, in 
order to create value for energy savings through market mechanisms. Some MS, 
such as UK, Italy, France and Denmark have already established a system of nation-
al energy saving obligations, also known as White Certificates40. In systems like this 
type, utilities are required to deliver a fixed amount of energy savings by implement-
ing energy efficiency improvements among their customers or in other sectors, such 
as energy generation or transport.  
 The European manufacturing industry is the sector at which remarkable im-
provement have already been achieved. According to Eurostat's reports, 20% of E 
U’s primary energy consumption counts for this sector. Despite the improvement, a 
number of obstacles discourage further opportunities and the main factor remains the 
difficulties in capital investments for small and medium sized enterprises. The Com-
mission tries to encourage MS to take specific initiatives, especially providing the in-
cumbent firms with information about legislative requirements, subsidies for machin-
ery upgrading and creating appropriate incentives. On the other hand, large compa-
nies are responsible to make regularly energy audits which from now and on are 
mandatory.  
  
 
 
                                                 
40
 In environmental policy, White Certificates indicate that a certain amount of energy reduction has already 
been attained.  
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6  Climate change “changed” Eu-
rope 
 This chapter aims to address all the issues regarding the Greenhouse gases with-
in EU territory. First of all, an understanding of the policy framework behind the 
greenhouse gas reduction as part of the tripartite target of 2020 will be initiated. In 
addition, a reference on the new cap and trade system of the updated EU ETS will 
follow, in order to identify the problems which arise and “block” a harmonized 
achievement in EU.  
 
6.1 Greenhouse Gas emissions reduction in Europe  
 
 Generally, the phenomenon of the climate change has already assimilated from 
people's consciousness as an issue which requires immediate concern, effectiveness 
and actions. The well-known changes in the climate, the rise of temperature; the shift 
in the rainfall patterns; the melting of snow; and the increase in sea level are ex-
pected to continue. According to several studies, it is very likely that most of the 
warming was caused by the greenhouse gases emitted by the various anthropogenic 
activities.  
 At EU level, around 11% of the greenhouse gases emitted worldwide each year 
come from within the EU. For this reason, the EU's priorities were to settle this matter 
and to work hard to achieve this reduction goal. An imperative solution responds only 
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to  this particular issue; the definition of comprehensive measures and guidelines 
which are going to be applied literally in order to give to this battle a meaning in the 
view of a sustainable future.  
 The European Commission is working alongside with the MS, since beyond the 
legislative framework which must be respected towards this task, each member state 
will have a share of responsibility in the results achieved, but this will be further dis-
cussed below.  
 The initial objective of the EU and from which all the other goals derived, are a 
highly-energy efficient and low carbon economy and towards this direction the reduc-
tion of Greenhouse gases has been focused progressively up to 2050. Hence, this 
chapter will be limited on the commitments in view of 2020 and in order to under-
stand the policy framework a trip to the recent past is necessary.  
 Since the early 1990s, EU has already implemented a variety of climate-related 
initiatives at European and at national level. Back in 2000, the European Commission 
had launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), in an effort to 
identify the most environmentally and costly effective policies and measures. Emis-
sion Trading Scheme was included in ECCP which admittedly constitutes a corner-
stone of EU climate change policy.  
 In 2003, Europe responded to the adoption of Kyoto Protocol (2002) by establish-
ing this scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, a set of quantitative and binding targets were posed, concerning GHG 
emission reductions. Kyoto Protocol was an international agreement linked to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under this instrument for 
tackling climate change, 37 industrialized countries agreed to reduce their emissions 
of certain GHG at least 5% over the period 2008-2012 compared to 1990 levels. At 
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that time, States which were members of EU before 2004 had to reduce those emis-
sions by 8% between 2008 and 2012. Hence, MS which joined EU after that date, 
had also to carry out this obligation for 8% reduction with some exceptions41.  
 The fundamental idea behind the ETS is the establishment of a market-based 
trading system by giving financial incentive of reducing emissions. Ellerman, et al. 
(2010)42 stated that the ETS is  
    “The world's largest market for carbon and the most significant  
    Multinational initiative taken to mobilize markets to protect the  
    environment”.  
 The EU ETS is based on the “cap and trade” principle, which in other words, sets 
a “cap” or a limit in the amount of emissions produced from the listed industries in 
Annex I of this Directive (activities in the energy/power sector, iron and steel produc-
tion and processing, the mineral industry, the wood pulp, paper and board industry) 
and this amount of emissions is reduced each year. Within this EU-wide cap, compa-
nies belonging to those sectors receive or buy emission allowances which are trada-
ble. By pricing carbon and thereby give a financial value to each tonne of emission 
saved, the ETS will successfully lead to an investment encouragement in clean tech-
nologies and to low-carbon solutions. The regulatory framework of the ETS was 
largely unchanged during its first trading periods of its operation, particularly the first 
“testing” period covered the period from the 1st January of 2005 up to the 31th De-
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 Poland and Hungary had to reduce GHG emissions by 6%. As for Malta and Cyprus Kyoto Protocol did not 
provide any reduction, since this target was addressed to countries listed in Annex I of the Framework Con-
vection and those two were not included.  
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 Ellerman,A.D,Convery, F.J. and  Perthuis, C., 2010. Pricing Carbon, the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press 
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cember of 2007 and the second from the 1st of January 2008 until the 31th of Decem-
ber 2012.  
 In March 2007, the European Council and the EU MS agreed in a 20% reduction 
of emissions below 1990 levels, and on a further international commitment of reduc-
ing 30% GHG if other developed countries commit to comply effectively towards this 
goal. In the third amendment of the Directive, several binding measures were adopt-
ed to meet this GHG target, defining the revised ETS Directive and the Effort Sharing 
Decision as the most important ones. While the revised ETS Directive provides 21% 
reduction on GHG compared the 2005 levels by 2020, the Effort Sharing Decision 
imposes a 10% GHG reduction of the non-ETS sectors. Furthermore, the Carbon 
Capture and Storage Directive was launched in order to contribute to the GHG target 
by regulating the use of this imminent technology.  
 
6.2 The transition to the third trading period and the new 
“cap and trade” system  
  
 In the first phase (2005-2007), the EU ETS was characterized by the generous 
allocation of emission allowances to enterprises in emission-intensive industries ac-
cording to the grandfathering principle (B¨οhringer and Lange, 2005). The central in-
strument for the EU ETS was the National Allocation Plan (NAP) which each MS 
should develop in order to state the quantity of allowances need for allocation in each 
period and the distribution of those among the national industries. Again, based on a 
statement of Bohringen, et al (2005), MS have been quite generous concerning the 
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allocation of allowances, which in other words implied that they wanted to issue more 
allowances than the actually emitted portions of GHG. The tradable assets of EU 
ETS are denoted as European Union Allowances (EUA) and each allowance is equal 
to 1 ton of CO2  emitted and the total emissions cap was defined by the aggregate of 
all MS plans. As a result, the decision of grandfathering the allowances had led to a 
“significant outcry about windfall profits” (Ellerman and Buncher, 2007). However, the 
methodology applied by MS as regards this allocation, sometimes was a very com-
plex procedure with cases of lobbying and external interferences for interests.   
 While up to now, the allocation of allowances was taking place for free in the re-
spective industries since 2013 and onwards their acquisition will be through the form 
of auctioning as regards the energy sector. This mean, that the companies con-
cerned would have to pay an amount of money which will be gradually increased  
each year , to obtain in exchange the right to pollute, satisfying the principle that the 
“polluter should pay the damage”. The most “unlucky” sector was the energy/power 
sector, since from 2013 onwards companies from this sector should have to buy all of 
their allowances.  
 The revised ETS Directive provides a harmonized emission trading system with 
no further obligation by MS to develop NAPs, but now a harmonized linear reduction 
of average 1, 74% each year, which will result in a 21% reduction by 2020 compared 
to 2005 levels.  
 Besides the auctioned allowances which power sector should purchase, 80% of 
the allowances about to be allocated in all the other sectors, will be given for free with 
a gradual decrease to 30% by 2020. The allowances distributed to manufacturing in-
dustry for free are treated equally across the EU and they are defined using bench-
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marks. The rules of benchmarking43 are based on historical data, that take the aver-
age performance of the 10% most efficient installations in 2007-2008 as a starting 
point(Benz, et al. 2010).On the 15th December 2010, the European Commission's 
Climate Change committee proposed benchmarks for 52 products for manufacturing 
sectors covering 75% industrial emissions in EU ETS (European Commission, 2012).  
 Another key point remains the energy-intensive industries which are subject to 
international competitiveness. With this in mind, energy-intensive industries are taken 
care of by the revised EU ETS Directive, since are exposed to carbon leakage by re-
ceiving up 100% of the needed certificates for free. Those industries included in this 
category will be given allowances equal to the historical data of emissions reported, 
for the whole 2013-2020 period (European Union, 2013).  
 One of the main arguments in favor of auctioning the allowances is the auction 
revenues which can be used towards the transition to low-carbon economies. The 
Directive stipulates that at least half of the auction revenues will directly contribute to 
the combat of climate change in Europe and in other countries (European Commis-
sion, 2013). Hence, the administration of the auction earnings lays on the jurisdiction 
of the MS and the so far initial announcements by MS indicate that MS are not going 
to use the same pattern regarding their investment or distribution (CDC Climate Re-
search, 2013).  
 
6.3 Effort Sharing Decision  
 
                                                 
43
 “Benchmarking is a treshold for what amount of allowances an installation gets for free” Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/benchmarking/  
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 The first two trading periods of the EU ETS allowed to learn some things regard-
ing the amendments needed to occur in order to transform the EU ETS into a power-
ful “weapon“ against climate change in EU. One of the things which came up was 
that the system was reluctant to harmonize some basic rules. Among other 
measures, a way to prevent this discrepancy of happening again was the Decision 
406/2009/EC of Effort Sharing (European Union, 2009).  
 According to Lacasta, et al. (2010), the Effort Sharing decision adopts the same 
philosophy as the burden sharing of Kyoto Protocol, which is about of sharing the ef-
fort. However, there is a difference between burden sharing and the effort decision 
and it lays on the fact, that the latter only applies to the sectors which are not covered 
by the EU ETS. These sectors cover mostly small-scale diffuse emitters such as 
transport, residential and office buildings, services, agriculture and waste.  
 For cost-effectiveness and fairness, both EU ETS and non-ETS sectors have to 
contribute together to the overall emission reduction efforts. For this reason, the 
above mentioned non-ETS sectors are now bound to cut EU-wide GHG's by 10% 
compared to 2005 levels.  
 This Decision sets national emission targets for 2020, by taking into account as 
baseline emissions the 2005 levels. The following figure illustrates these different per 
MS targets which are set based on the MS relative wealth (measured by the Gross 
Domestic Product per capita).  
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Figure 7: Effort Sharing targets compared to 2005 levels 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/index_en.htm  
 
 As it can be seen, the targets range from a 20% emission reduction by 2020 from 
the richest MS to a 20% increase from the least wealthy MS, namely Bulgaria. Obvi-
ously, the increase in emissions targets to a higher economic growth caused by in-
dustrial activity which automatically leads to higher emissions.  
 By and large, if these national targets deliver the desired 10% reduction from the 
emissions not covered in the ETS which accompanied by the 21% emission reduc-
tion from the sectors covered in ETS, a 20% cut below 1990 levels will be achieved 
by 2020.  
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6.4 Harmonisation of Member states and the Carbon 
leakage challenge 
 
 From the time of the initial introduction of the Emissions Trading Scheme, the EU 
ETS has become the cornerstone of EU climate policy which provoked heated de-
bates both inside and outside EU. The EU ETS performance over the first two trading 
periods was very constructive, as it could made clear and visible the loopholes which 
should be and indeed addressed over the post-2012 period.  
  The problematic process for setting caps and allowances under each MS jurisdic-
tion was indeed decentralized in the first place, as MS had the obligation to develop 
proposals of their own “unique” national carbon caps (Kruger, Oates and Pizer, 
2007). However, this decentralized system has led to a “race to the bottom” dynamic 
among MS, by giving them the entitlement of deciding how and to which were going 
to distribute the free allowances (Skjaerseth and Wettestaol, 2008). 
 In the process of finalizing the NAPs, a lot of factors influenced and enriched the 
generosity of MS. Firstly, the inefficient allocation, as it can be proved now, was en-
hanced by the inexperience of MS in dealing with the emissions of their national in-
dustries. In addition, EU seemed to ignore this inability and pressed even more the 
situation by providing insufficient period of time in order  MS to implement their 
NAPs. Lastly, the asymmetry on emissions data complexes evens more the success-
ful task of MS's obligation. As a result, each MS chose to take the “safe side”, from 
the angle of uncertainty, and finally were generous with allowances to protect their 
economic competitiveness. (Reinaud, 2009) 
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 Conversely, this decentralized pattern did not work out properly and the desired 
reduction levels had not been accomplished. The inherent factors of decentralization 
were identified by the European Commission as regards the so far EU allocation sys-
tem and phase III resulted in harmonized and coordinated rules, based on the les-
sons learnt from the first trading periods. The areas subject to correction were the 
high degree of MS autonomy to decide on their economic and environmental issues 
at a national level; the lack of a commonly methodology regarding the harmonized 
allocation to installations and the large heterogeneity among MS notably major differ-
ences in efforts needed to achieve the targets. (Reinaud, 2009) 
 With this intention, EU re-shaped EU ETS to correct and eliminate those prob-
lems identified and as a result, the NAPs were replaced by harmonized EU-wide 
rules. To point out, one EU-wide cap exists from now and on, instead of 27 national 
caps and the harmonization has not only touch the caps but also, the auction rules, 
the free allocation of allowances to carbon exposed firms, the special provisions for 
the new entrants and the coverage. (Parker, 2010) 
 Nevertheless, the wrong movements as regards phase I and II of the past pro-
voked some indirect costs. The root of the problem originates at the fact that the ini-
tial distribution of allowances led to complaints from energy-intensive industries 
against the “windfall” profits of power generators when prices significantly increased 
in 2005. (Aldy and Stavins, 2011) This means, that the free allocation of allowances 
had indeed consequences, and both direct and indirect costs were increased. Speak-
ing of the direct costs, the free allocation enabled the passing through of opportunity 
costs of those free allowances which resulted in higher electricity pric-
es.(Reinaud,2009) 
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 From the energy-intensive industries' side, the increase in the electricity prices 
had indirect effects which doubted the sense of equality and impartiality of the cli-
mate change policies in Europe, as electricity firms were charging customers includ-
ing electricity-intensive industry for allowances which had received for free in the first 
place. However, the lifeline of energy-intensive sectors was the long-term electricity 
contracts which were a relief from the intensity of electricity prices.  (Economist, 
2008) 
 But, besides these indirect effects of EU ETS former structure, the energy-
intensive sector was opened to a new front the one of the industrial competitiveness. 
According to Reinaud (2008a), industrial competitiveness becomes meaningful, since 
some countries implement abatement policies while others do not. From a business 
perspective, the side which do not, automatically earns a comparative advantage 
over the other side, subject to profit generation.  
 In the direction of implementing a low-carbon economy, competition will always 
be the issue, the barrier or the challenge. In the case, that competition remains a 
challenge, carbon leakage phenomenon takes shape whereby emission reduction 
efforts in one country would be offset by emissions increase in non-carbon con-
straints regions. For example, carbon constraints in Europe can have as direct con-
sequence the enhancement of the competition in China. In other words, the implied 
high cost of carbon in Europe compares to the zero cost in other countries can lead 
the energy-intensive industries either to source their carbon-intensive inputs from the 
unconstrained regions or to relocate, especially sectors with international exposure 
such as aluminium, steel and cement. That is to say, in the short-term carbon leak-
age can lead to loss of market share, as the exports would be decreased while im-
ports would be increased, ruining Europe's competitiveness. It cannot also be ig-
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nored the detrimental consequences of job losses in this critical financial period 
which Europe experiences.  
 However, it is complex to quantify the level of carbon leakage resulted from the 
EU ETS. Several studies came up with arguments for and against the influential 
bondage of carbon leakage and EU ETS can have. In theory, carbon leakage factor 
for a sector depends on the cost of allocation and the distribution pattern (Demailly 
and Quirion, 2007). For this reason, all the industries significantly exposed to carbon 
leakage have been privileged by a totally free allocation of allowances. With this in-
tention, Europe “bought” some extra time, since the previous trading periods due to 
their short duration could not allow for full observation of the carbon leakage poten-
tial. So, it is a matter of time to see the effects of EU ETS in the energy-intensive sec-
tor but not in the short-run.  
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7 Energy-intensive Industry: privi-
leged or victim of the EU poli-
cies  
 This chapter tries to discover if the energy-intensive sector suffers from the cur-
rent EU policies in the energy field. In the process of identifying whether this state-
ment is true or not, a list of implications from the current energy legislation will be 
provided and a more advanced “look” over the most intensive manufacturing indus-
tries of EU as well.  
 
7.1 What are the facts? 
 
 One of the issues that have troubled many stakeholders in Europe is the much 
discussed challenges that the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries face 
nowadays. Undoubtedly, the cornerstone of Europe's climate policy, the ETS has 
posed numerous impacts on the competitive ability of EIIs, with the most adverse ef-
fect, the carbon leakage resulting in the delocalisation of industrial produc-
tion.(European Union,2013) But what are the real facts for the various industrial sec-
tors under threat? Are the industrial sectors challenged only from the climate policies 
in Europe? 
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 Generally, European industrial sectors consume cumulatively the 1/3 of the ener-
gy produced in Europe, and to be more specific the 1/5 of the electricity is used in 
Europe for manufacturing. Among the highest energy-intensive products which are 
affected by the mechanism of CO2 are the cement, lime, plaster, iron and steel.  
 
7.1.1 The case of cement, lime and plaster  
 
 The cement, lime and plaster market is fully globalized and so far there are con-
siderable price variations between countries and even within countries, mainly due to 
high transport costs. For example, in Europe cement price is around 50-70 Euro/ton, 
while in Latin America and United States, cement has prices of around 100 Euro/ton. 
As a consequence, Europe has low prices in the global market, considering the 
enormous production costs. According to Ecofys, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
and Innovation Research and Öko-Institut (2009),  
    “The 5 largest European companies accounted for 57% of the total  
    cement output in the EU25 in year 2003, and each comprises   
    between 23-34 cement plants in the whole EU.” 
Now, these European companies are large multinationals with a significant market 
share globally and among them are Heidelberger (Germany), Holderbank (Switzer-
land), Italcementi (Italy) and Lafarge (France).   
 The future economic condition of these sectors is highly related and influenced by 
the demand from the construction sector. Indeed, over the last 25 years, some Euro-
pean countries have increased even three times their consumption on these products 
(such as Greece, Portugal and Spain)(European Union,2013). The lime and plaster, 
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but considerably cement industry not only are energy-intensive, but also capital in-
tensive and access to capital markets is a key factor.  
 Obviously, the production procedures of cement have also to face the challenge 
of environmental regulation and especially related to CO2 and emissions reductions. 
However, with reference to European Union Energy-intensive Industry Study(2013), 
the cost for a typical European cement process will increase by 36,5% due to ETS. 
The biggest part of around 93% of this cost will concern the direct emissions and the 
rest 7% will reflect the impact of higher electricity prices.  
 
7.1.2 The case of iron and steel  
 
 The iron and steel industry has to face several challenges. First of all, the truth is 
that the centre of the steel business is moved to East, as new competitors such as 
China pose threats to the viability of the European iron and steel industries. Within a 
ten years period, the EU27's overall share of world crude steel output fell from 24, 
3% in 1997 to 16% in 2007(European Union, 2013). Likely at the present time, 22% 
of the world steel comes from Europe, letting China in the second place of the largest 
steel industries in the world. As a matter of fact, Europe's steel industry produces and 
delivers all types and qualities of steel products and accordingly the comparative ad-
vantage is strongly related to product innovation and value creation towards the other 
“threats”. 
 Another key issue remains the dependency of expensive raw materials which are 
imported from outside EU. Hence, the increase in the prices and the imbalances in 
demand and supply of raw materials grow the need for a level playing field in the 
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trade policies. Therefore, iron and steel sector involve large production requirements 
to achieve economies of scale.  
 Moreover, the climate policies pose obstacles in the overall competitive trajectory 
of these two sectors, again related to CO2 and emission reductions. The direct effects  
of emission reduction was of paramount concern since a percentage of around 95% 
of emissions are process emissions, Considering, the 15% share of energy input in 
the production process, was the primary cause of improving energy efficiency for re-
ducing energy consumption. Despite the reduction in energy consumption of 47% per 
tonne, this venture consists one more costly burden in the already high capital inten-
sity of these sectors.  
 In overall, the steel industry faces four challenges the high energy prices the cli-
mate legislation, the trade restrictions due to high transport intensity and the cost for 
R&D.  
 
7.2 Energy-intensive Industries and the side effects of 20-
20-20  
  
 Generally, EU is the only major region that has seriously tried to integrate its en-
ergy and climate policies. Several studies have shown that the environmental regula-
tion influences the European economy, and particularly the EIIs (Dannenberg, Men-
nel and Moslener, 2007). In the light of Europe's decarbonization, 10 billion of euros 
were invested in order for RES and low carbon sources to become more commercial-
ly viable. However, despite the fact that Europe struggles to cut the polluting emis-
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sions, the emissions are still rising globally, in a way that the emissions are “export-
ing” as the case of China (Nytimes, 2012).  
 As it was described in the previous chapter, the various EU climate policies affect 
both directly and indirectly the competitiveness of EIIs. In fact, the commitment of 
energy-intensive industries to contribute to the increase of  20% in energy savings by 
2020, has put extra projects in their portfolio. The EU's energy efficiency bill burdens 
even more EIIs during the on-going recession period that Europe faces. However, 
the Energy Efficiency Directive aims to strengthen the market for energy efficient 
product and services, but still decarbonisation has a price to pay. Therefore, in the 
effort of achieving technological advancements towards energy efficiency, the EIIs 
have to bear not only the cost of energy efficiency, but also the higher electricity pric-
es due to RES and ETS. Due to differences in energy intensity and to approaches to 
substitute energy intensive technologies by more efficient ones, the cost varies sub-
stantially between countries, sectors and firms.  
 The main consideration which should be taken into account towards Europe's 
competitiveness remains the energy prices. Generally speaking, the EU electricity 
prices for industrial consumers are on average 25% higher than electricity prices in 
U.S (Europolitics, 2013). The increase in the electricity prices is provoked not only 
due to ETS but also due to expensive renewables. Whereas electricity prices tend to 
fall due to renewable energy penetration, the green subsidies for supporting RES 
make the industrial consumers feel neurotic and for these reasons many MS aban-
don subsidizing them. In 2013, Arnaldo Abruzzini44 stated that  
    “In a few years, the success of today’s energy policy will be measured 
    not only by the number of wind turbines and solar panels that have  
                                                 
44
 Arnaldo Abruzzini is Secretary-general of Eurochambres.  
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    been built, but also by the price we had to pay for the transition to clean 
    energy”. (Europolitics, 2013) 
 Undoubtedly, EIIs competition is influenced by the vicious cycle of high energy 
prices. In the event that electricity prices are being pushed up by carbon trading then 
their business will be close to closure. As a matter of fact this will occur, since the 
globally competing EIIs are not as privileged as the power producers who can “pass 
through” additional cost due to carbon trading to the consumers. Yet in the case that, 
EIIs increase the price of their products due to the additional costs of energy prices 
then they will upset their market share in the international markets.  
  Certainly, the entitlement of receiving allowances for free is a relief, but at the 
same time, the fact that are exposed to competition from producers outside Europe 
which are not suffering from this kind of expenditures, their call for a level playing 
field is justified (Wettestad, 2008).  
 
7.3 Two sides of the same coin  
 
 As can be seen up to now, Europe and its decisions on climate policies provoke a 
competition imbalance between the EU and overseas EIIs. Certainly, the facts have 
shown that this statement is quite truthful, but what if EIIs were not so “losers” as 
they seem to be? In the case that energy policies financially damaged EIIs, a series 
of facts can conclude exact the opposite.  
 To begin with, EU industry has benefited significantly from EU climate policies for 
various or reasons. This fact seems to be controversial, since these beneficial out-
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comes arise from the ETS concept itself, the one that EIIs have claimed to be cata-
strophic for their competitive existence globally. With a closer look to some of the 
ETS sectors, some companies such as Arcelor Mittal and Lafarge had a huge sur-
plus of CO2 emissions permits (Corporate Europe, 2010). First thing to remember, is 
that ETS is a market based mechanism, which in other words enable the trading of 
CO2 permits among the participants companies with a significant “profit”, sufficient 
enough to incentive them towards a low-carbon technology transformation. In some 
cases, the amount of money earned from this kind of transactions was enormous 
enough, just by considering the Lafarge's surplus of more than 23 million allowances, 
with a value of over 300 million euro (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2011). In 2012, 
Lafarge earned almost 99 million euros from selling allowances, which were initially 
obtained for free and those earnings could be invested in energy efficiency 
measures. According to a study of Corporate Europe Observatory (2010) on Arcelor 
Mittal and Lafarge: 
“The 2009 financial report reveals that Arcelor Mittal has earned 108 
million euros selling permits since 2007 and this is just a fraction of 
what their remaining surplus of permits is worth. Arcelor Mittal's 
strategy is to not sell the entire surplus, but to keep a significant 
propotion for future use. The iron and steel sector has benefited 
from generous  over-allocations. According to latest Commission 
figures, it was allocated 184,949,947 allowances in 2009 while the 
verified emissions were in fact just over half that amount 
(94,053,080 tons).” 
 Obviously, the allocation of allowances was a tough task for MS, however, the re-
sult of allocating more allowances to industries than the actual amount needed, rais-
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es questions about whether it was done purely due to lack of previous experience, or 
aimed at specific interests, or even worst was a result of severe pressure from the 
various stakeholders. As a matter of fact, a lot of literature was focused on the lobby-
ing effect of EIIs and their representative Boards in the evolution of ETS system 
(Corporate Europe, 2010). After all, under repeated threats for relocation outside EU, 
mainly from the cement and the steel sectors, the EU Commission was forced to re-
think the revision of ETS. Yet, the data indicated that companies have lobbied sever-
al EU institutions intensively to obtain the same “privileges” under phase III of ETS 
(2013-2020). As can be seen, at MS level, industries have been successful in influ-
encing key MS such as Germany and UK, which the former being the MS with the 
most allowances allocated due to industry-intensive characteristic (Wettestad,2008).  
 In Germany, the EIIs' claim of power producers' windfall profits due to ETS ac-
quired enormous dimensions which lead to substantial investigations of the two larg-
est power generators EON and RWE. As a consequence, according to Wet-
testad(2008), Germany adjusted its negative attitude towards the use of allowance 
auctioning which had as overall result the continuation of allocating for free allowanc-
es in EIIs under phase III. A similar disposition derives from the side of UK, since it 
was clear that all UK industries intentionally except the power sector, acquired more 
allowances than they needed, specifically the ceramics sector which obtained 50% 
more allowances.  
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Conclusions 
 
 In the introduction of the thesis, we have identified the two EU milestones of the 
EU energy and climate policies that this thesis aimed to address, as well as their im-
plications due to their coexistence in the competitiveness of the EU energy-intensive 
industry. 
 In the process of addressing the aim of the thesis, the dissertation objectives 
have been central to the structure of the research which were the following: 
 
Dissertation Objective 1 – With attention to the harmonization of the electricity mar-
kets, the dissertation aims to explore the coexistence and the functionality of the 
measures concurrently implemented towards the integration of the electricity markets 
in parallel with the measures posed by the Energy and Climate policy for the 
achievement of the 20/20/20 target.  
 
Dissertation Objective 2 – The dissertation aims to identify and analyse the possi-
ble implications resulted from the already mentioned policies in the competitiveness 
of the energy-intensive industry.  
 
Seeking to achieve the dissertation objectives, a number of research questions have 
been arose. The main questions are the following: 
 
Research Question 1 – To what extent do the various EU climate policies enhance 
the top priority of the EU? On the condition that their coexistence impoverish the EU's 
ultimate target, which are the causes of their malfunction? 
 
Research Question 2 – To what extent does the “decarbonisation” strategy of Eu-
rope pose competition obstacles in the international exposure of the energy-intensive 
industry of EU?  
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8.1.1 Conclusions Research Question 1 
 
 The largest part of this research aims to answer the first question. Making a com-
prehensive reference to the legislation, with intention to identify the legal obligations 
of Member States through the various Directives, we tried to identify the main com-
plications which are always created when you go through theory to practice. 
 In chapter 2, we introduced the concept of the IEM and the most compelling thing 
to remember is that through the Third Energy package, the goals of the IEM have in-
cluded the decarbonisation and the energy security. Undoubtedly, it can be seen that 
the two key approaches-the IEM and the 20/20/20 targets- of the EU climate and en-
ergy regime are complementary. Certainly, the rational sequence of their implemen-
tation provides that with a successful integrated energy market with sufficient inter-
connections between MS can accelerate the sustainability goals. Therefore, through 
the IEM, the decarbonisation can be achieved in a cost-effective way. On the whole, 
the direct benefits of the IEM enhance the effort towards sustainability and the EU 
Electricity target model is ideal for serving the single energy market objective.  
 At the same time, the interaction of Europe's energy and climate targets seems to 
be problematic. There are a lot of obstacles which are posed by the renewable and 
the emissions targets, since energy savings accompanied by the recently 2012 En-
ergy Efficiency Directive focus only to binding measures rather than binding targets.  
 Initially, the various policy reversals provoked a certain degree of regulatory inse-
curity which resulted in investment uncertainty. Especially, towards the creation of 
the IEM, the necessity of investing in infrastructure, in interconnections, in storage 
facilities is imperative. However, not only the technical perspectives are being ques-
tioned, but also the unification of the energy markets is being delayed by the selec-
tive harmonization between MS concerning the RES target. Accordingly, this enables 
Member States to develop individual strategy by implementing national support 
schemes and markedly rejecting the FMs which would foster the integration of the 
energy markets. This degree of “freedom” can be catalytic in the light of a single 
market because it is highly left to the MS's political willingness to contribute effective-
ly to the integration.  
 In addition, the emissions target and particularly the ETS market-based mecha-
nism seemed to create a plethora of indirect implications which jeopardize the IEM's 
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objective of affordable access to energy. The initial structure of the allocation of al-
lowances and the grandfathering principle had led to windfall profits of the power 
generators and as a result passing through of opportunity costs-of the free allowanc-
es- resulted in higher electricity prices. Also, the carbon leakage turned EU's atten-
tion to the energy-intensive industry in fear of their delocalization. However, this ad-
verse effect was the reason of deviating from a successful establishment of clear cli-
mate policies, by forcing EU to issue industrial policies undermining the effectiveness 
of climate policy.  
8.1.2 Conclusions Research Question 2 
 
 In chapter 7, the literature aims to provide a more advanced and detailed over-
sight to the EU climate policy challenge, the case of the EIIs. Undoubtedly, the “car-
bon trading” through ETS was the reason of numerous indirect consequences that 
justifiably led the energy-intensive manufactures to claim that will proceed with relo-
cation of their industrial productions outside Europe. In the process of balancing the 
arguments for and against, the research came up with some hidden truths regarding 
the EIIs.  
 On the one hand, the “ugly truth” is that EU is the only region at which climate 
change is significantly taken to a large extent into account. On the whole, EIIs seems 
to be evolved negatively in the various EU climate policies. Firstly, they are obliged to 
invest in energy efficiency measures, secondly have to partly bear the cost for the 
development of renewable energy sources, and finally the indirect costs of higher 
electricity prices due to ETS. The free allocation of allowances certainly mitigates the 
overall cost, but in overall the EU's climate policy bill for EIIs is still large.  
 On the other hand, a point often overlooked especially from the industries' side is 
that the current treatment of them, in the ETS latest configuration, was a result of an 
extensive lobbying. In particular, it is important to realize that industries included in 
the ETS sector have been successful in influencing key MS which in turn aimed to 
serve those interests. Equally important is the fact, this mechanism was an income 
source for the EIIs, sufficient enough to cover their transformation to low-carbon 
technologies. In reality, the over-allocation of allowances in the early years of ETS 
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has been beneficial in monetary terms raising questions whether it was a result of 
inexperience or was done on purpose.  
8.2 Future research 
 
 The dissertation aimed to accomplish their posed objectives by gathering a fairly 
wide range of necessary information. The issues with which this dissertation deals 
are fundamental for the energy policy of Europe. For this reason, within the time 
frame of the study completion, new facts and MS' decisions constantly came at the 
surface. As a consequence, the conceptual framework of this dissertation can be re-
evaluated in the future by reflecting all the new evolutions.  
 On the 5th of November 2013, the European Commission through its Communica-
tion aimed to provide to the Member States all the necessary data, guidelines and 
best practice in hand for successful National schemes. This intervention was de-
signed for the Renewable energy Support Schemes and the Back-up Capacities. 
However, this Communication is not a legally binding act yet, and it will be quite in-
teresting to be examined in the future, since it can remarkably change the current 
problematic situation.  
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